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Abstract 
The paper examines the reaction of banks and insurance companies’ stocks listed on the Nigerian Stock Market 
to two major terrorist events (the bomb blast on October 1, 2010-Nigeria’s 50
th
 independence anniversary day, 
and the bombing of the United Nation’s (UN) embassy office on August 26, 2011, all in Abuja). The data stream 
for the study consisted of the Nigerian Stock Exchange Daily Official list on some selected banks and insurances 
stocks over the event period of eight (8) days for both the United Nation’s (UN) embassy office bombing and the 
October 1 bomb blast respectively. Using the standard event study methodology and the single-factor market 
model, the study finds that of the two terrorist events, only the October 1, 2010 attack resulted in significant 
negative abnormal returns in the Nigerian stock market. The UN office bombing, though expectedly resulted in a 
negative abnormal return, the abnormal return was however not statistically significant at 5% level and only 
occurred a day after the event day, suggesting that the stock prices reacted rather slowly. The study therefore 
recommends that the federal government of Nigeria should explore ways of reducing the frustration of her 
citizens because the consistent neglect by successive governments to improve on the well-being of the 
commoners in this oil-rich nation has always led to frustration and aggression, and these are popular substratum 
for terrorism. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism is by no means a new vocabulary or phenomenon. However, since the Al Qaeda terrorist attack 
directed at the World Trade Centre (WTC) in the United States of America (USA) on 11
th
 September, 2001, 
terrorism has assumed a new significance drawing global attention and concern. The increasing concern over the 
acts of terrorism all over the world is hinged on the magnitude and scale of damage orchestrated by such acts, the 
attendant loss of human lives, and properties, and the increasing sophistication and expertise with which such 
terror acts are unleashed.  
Nigeria unfortunately has been one of the most vulnerable to the paradigm shift of terrorism. Her 
vulnerability is mainly subjected on one hand to her relevance in the African economy, and on the other hand, to 
the consistent neglect by her successive governments to improve on the well-being of the commoners in this oil-
rich nation. Harping on the Nigeria state’s neglect and apathy to enhance the common good of the common 
people and lack of propriety in handling oil revenues, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD, 
2008:33) pointed out quite eloquently and forcefully in its report that: 
“Nigeria presents a remarkable paradox of an enormously wealthy country both in potential and real 
terms yet, serving as home to the third largest concentration of poor people in the world. The country 
annually makes substantial revenue from oil and gas but has apparently failed to provide basic services 
for its people”. 
According to Lawson (1965), “frustration ultimately leads to aggression”. Amaraegbu (2011) states 
that when individuals are subjected to a situation of alienation and extreme frustration, it makes them act 
unusually aggressively. 
In Nigeria, terrorism started to assume significance in the 1990s with the Niger delta conflict which 
gradually escalated into a multidimensional resistance in 2008. The new dimension saw to huge destruction of 
oil installations, kidnapping of both foreign and indigenous oil workers, disruption of oil production and illegal 
oil trade or bunkering. And as a country that depends on crude oil earnings as a major source of foreign 
exchange, disruption of oil production resulted in huge national budgetary deficits (Amaraegbu, 2011:210). 
The organizations in the Niger Delta creek of South-South Nigeria involved in these acts of terrorism 
include Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Nigeria Delta Peoples Volunteer Force 
(NDPVF), the Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta, Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and the Martyrs 
Brigade, to mention but a few. MEND is about the most visible armed group based in the region, and the main 
militant organization attacking oil infrastructure for political objectives (Energy Information Administrations 
(EIA), 2010). Formed in 2005 with more than 30 camps throughout Nigeria, it is a loose coalition of armed 
militant groups from the region. Although most of its attacks have been targeted at oil pipelines and supply 
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terminals on the creeks and swamps of the region, it has created a sense of insecurity and panic many miles 
offshore at different times in Lagos and Abuja. For instance, on July 12, 2009 MEND, in what was described as 
“Al Qaeda-style terrorism” blew up the receptor pipelines inside the 50 million-litre capacity Atlas Cove Jetty in 
Lagos, effectively crippling the capacity of the facility to receive petroleum products (Interview, Lagos, July 29, 
2010). And on October 1, 2010, two vehicle loaded with improvised explosive devices were detonated by 
MEND near Abuja Eagle Square, venue of the parade marking the country’s 50
th
 anniversary of independence 
causing substantial damage and fatal casualties (Reuters, 2010). However, MEND appears for the mean time to 
have been tamed with her recent disarmament due to the olive leaf offered her by the Federal Government of 
Nigeria (FGN). 
Recently, the tide of violence and terrorism appears to have shifted from the South to the Northern 
parts of the country due to the terrorist activities of a religious sect called Boko Haram. Boko Haram became 
active in Nigeria in about 2003 and is concentrated mainly in the Northern Nigeria states of Yobe, Kano, Bauchi, 
Borno and Kaduna. One of the most significant terrorist acts of the sect was the bombing of the United Nation’s 
Embassy office in Abuja on August 17, 2011 that claimed several lives and destroyed a lot of properties. 
Obviously, acts of terrorism affect virtually every sector of the national economy. However, the impact 
on the financial markets is often quite enormous and consequential considering the fact that the financial markets 
are regarded as the nucleus of any economic system (Gul et al, 2010). Keeping in view the importance of the 
financial market for the Nigeria’s economy, the quantification of the impact of terrorism on Nigeria’s financial 
market becomes, not only quite expedient and timely but also an interesting area of research work. 
Pointedly, the study seeks to determine whether Nigeria’s financial market reacts to acts of terrorism 
using the case of commercial banks and insurance companies’ reaction to two very important terrorist attacks in 
Nigeria, namely the 50
th
 Independence Day Anniversary bombing at the Eagle Square, Abuja, and the bombing 
of the United Nation’s (UN) office, also in Abuja. 
This study is important for several reasons. First, we explore the link between terrorist events and their 
impact on the stock market. According to Karolyi and Martell (2006), stock and bond prices arguably 
incorporate investors’ beliefs and views about future cash flows and discount rates because the liquidity of 
financial markets provides an efficient conduit for these views to be quickly reflected in asset prices. Secondly, 
increasing integration of global stock markets and advances in technology means reaction to international events 
also gets quickly incorporated in stock prices and hence could have contagion effects across continents. 
According to Chen and Siems (2004), global capital markets today are tightly inter-linked such that news spread 
quickly especially bad news, with quick spill-over or contagion effects. Thirdly, Boko Haram terrorist activities 
is a new dimension to terror acts in Nigeria and the study of the impact on the Nigerian stock market should 
make the government and all concerned parties give the issue the attention it deserves, and more importantly to 
seek for ways of alleviating the sufferings of her people who feel disfranchised rather than “tear-gassing” them.  
To the best of our knowledge, there has not been an earlier work that explicitly explored the reaction of 
banks and insurance companies stocks to terrorism on Nigeria’s financial markets using event study 
methodology. This therefore makes this study quite unique. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
Although there exists a quantum of studies on the impact of terrorism on stock markets, we find limited literature 
on the quantification of reaction of banks and insurance companies’ stocks to acts of terrorism, especially in 
Nigeria. 
One of the few available studies is the one due to Johnson, et al (2005) which analyzed the reaction of 
the financial market to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the New York, and March 11, 2004 attacks in 
Madrid. They conclude that given the accurate timely response of the authorities, the financial markets of U.S 
and Spain respectively were able to absorb the shocks of the terrorist attacks. 
Bart, et al (2006), using some panel data on terrorism showed that acts of terrorism have negative, 
depressing and unfavourable influence on economic progress. Berrebi and Klor (2005) assessed the impact of 
terrorism on the stock-market valuation of Israeli companies that are traded in American markets. The study 
suggests that the impact on stock valuation of companies involved with defence, security and anti-terrorism 
products or clients was positive while for other companies it was negative. 
Drakos (2004) investigated the effects of terror attacks of 9/11 on a set of airline stocks listed at 
various international stock markets. The study found that conditional systematic risk has on the average more 
than doubled which would have implications for portfolio diversification and the cost of airlines in raising 
capital. Elder and Melnick (2004) analyzed the impact of Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israel’s stock market 
prices and exchange rates in Israel using daily time series data from 1990 to 2003. They found that the attacks 
had a parliament effect on both stock and foreign exchange markets but location of terrorist attack had no effect 
in either of the markets.  
Gul et al, (2005) examined the impact of terrorism on the financial markets of Pakistan and found that 
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terrorist activities adversely affected the financial markets under study but concluded that the significance of the 
adverse effect varied for different markets. 
Liargovas and Repousis (2010) investigated the reaction of Greek banks’ stocks to three different 
major international terrorist events using the event study methodology. The events were: (a) the September 11, 
2001 Al Qaeda terrorist attack at the WTC, USA; ( b) the Madrid bombing on March 11, 2004 in Spain and (c) 
the London Train bombing on July 7, 2005. They found that of the three terrorist attacks, only the September 11, 
2001 resulted in significant abnormal returns in the Greek banks stocks due to the dominant position of the 
United States of America economy worldwidw. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
The event study methodology is employed in this study to analyze the response of banks and insurance 
companies’ stocks to acts of terrorism in Nigeria. The objective of event study is to measure the effect of an 
economic event on the value of firms. The usefulness of such a study stems from the belief that, given rationality 
in the market place, the effects of an event (in this case, terrorist attack) will be reflected instantaneously in 
security prices. Thus, a measure of the event’s economic impact can be constructed using security prices 
observed over a relatively short time periods. 
For the present study, two very important terrorist events in Nigeria were selected. The first is the 
Independence Day Anniversary bombing of October 1, 2010 that occurred at Eagle Square, Abuja which claimed 
lives and properties. The second is the bombing of the United Nations (UN) embassy office on August 26, 2011, 
still in Abuja, which also claimed several lives and destroyed properties in Abuja. While MEND was said to be 
responsible for the first case, Boko Haram sect claimed responsibility for the second bombing event. 
The two events have been selected because of their relevance in the history of Nigeria. The first case- 
the 50
th
 Independence Anniversary Day bombing is very significant because it took place on the date that marks 
Nigeria’s liberation from British colonialism. An act of terrorism on this memorable day is akin to dragging the 
nation back to servitude and enslavement. The second event is also very significant because an attack on UN 
embassy office in Nigeria meant, by implication an attack on several nations of the world who are members of 
the Union.                                      
The procedure for event study according to Osuala (2007) entail: 
 Clear definition of the event of interest and the period over which the security prices of the firms 
involved in the event would be examined. 
 Determination of the selection criteria 
 Definition of the event window 
 Calculation of the abnormal, normal and expected returns 
 Aggregation of the abnormal returns to obtain the cumulative abnormal returns 
 Designing a testing framework for the cumulative abnormal returns. 
We define the event date as the occasion of the very first occurrence of the terrorist attack as 
published in the national dailies. Normal return is defined as the return that would be expected if the event did 
not take place. The abnormal return is the actual return of the security over the event window. Therefore for each 
firm i, and event date t, we have: 
( / )it it it te R E R X= −  ------------------------------------------------------------   [1] 
where ite , itR  and ( )itE R are the abnormal, actual and expected (normal) returns, respectively, for the period t. 
tX  is the conditional information for normal performance model. The abnormal or residual return represents the 
part of the return that is not predicted and is therefore an estimate of the change in the firm’s stock value on the 
event date that is caused by the event, that is, the terrorist attack. 
There are two common choices for modeling the normal return: the constant-mean-return model where 
tX  is a constant, and the market model where tX  is the market return. This study employs the single-factor 
market model for estimating the impact of terrorist attacks on the Nigerian stock market, and it is given as: 
it i i mt itR R eα β= + +  ---------------------------------------------------------------------    [2] 
where itR = realized ( or actual) rate of return of the i
th
 security during period t. 
mtR = rate of return on the equally weighted market index m, at period t. 
ite = a random variable that is expected to have a value of zero. 
i iandα β = the intercept and slope parameters for the firm i, respectively. 
The abnormal return (AR) for the i
th 
common stock on day t, is given by: 
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ˆˆ( , ) [ ]it it i i mtAR or e Rit Rα β= − +  ------------------------------------------------- [3] 
where ˆˆ[ ]i i mtRα β+  is the expected rate of return, E(Rit); the coefficients ˆˆi iandα β  are ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimates of andα β  estimated from a regression of daily security returns on daily market returns over 
the estimation window (which is defined in our case as -31 to -45). The proper length of the event window is an 
empirical issue. Too long a window allows other news and events to offset the ones that are of interest to this 
study, while too short a window means that the effect of the event may not be fully incorporated, or observed. 
Osuala (2007) noted that for developed markets, the specification of the event window is usually two days (i.e., 0 
to +1), or three days (-1 to +1 days). However, for this study, the event window of eight days (-3 to +4) is chosen 
for reasons of poor information technological advancement in emerging markets like Nigeria, which constitutes 
an impediment to the speed of information dissemination. 
The individual security’s abnormal returns, itAR , is aggregated and averaged across all the observations in 
estimation period as shown below: 
1
N
EP
it
i
t
AR
AAR
N
=
=
∑
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [4] 
where tAAR = average abnormal return across the firms at time , t in the estimation period. 
EP
tAR = abnormal return at time, t in the estimation period, EP. 
N = number of firms in the sample. The reason for averaging is because stock returns are noisy, but the noise 
tends to cancel out when averaged across a large number of firms.  
 
Next, the average abnormal returns are aggregated over the event window to give the cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAAR). Thus, for any interval in the event window,  
2
1 2
1
,
t
t t it
t
CAAR AAR=∑  ------------------------------------------------------------------- [5] 
where, 
1 2,t t
CAAR = cumulative average residuals from t1 day to t2 day of the event window. 
 
 Parametric Tests: The parametric tests proposed in the literature by Brown and Warner (1985) relies on the 
important assumption that individual firm’s abnormal returns are normally distributed. The standard statistic is: 
( )
EP
t
AAR EP
t
AAR
t
AARσ
=  -----------------------------------------------------------------------  [6] 
where 
EP
tAAR  is average abnormal return at time, t in the estimation period, and ( )
EP
tAARσ  is the standard 
deviation of the average abnormal return derived in the estimation period; and  
( )
t
CAAR
t t
CAAR
t
AAR Nσ
=  ----------------------------------------------------------------  [7] 
where Nt = the absolute value of event day, t, plus 1 (Kusnadi and Sohrabian, 1999). 
The standard deviation of the abnormal returns in the estimation window is calculated thus: 
2
1
( )
( )
1
n
t
i
t
AAR AAR
AAR
n
σ =
−
=
−
∑
 ---------------------------------------------- [8] 
where n = the number of days in the estimation period 
AAR = average abnormal return over all firms in the estimation or control period and  tARR is the average 
abnormal return over all securities in period, t. 
 
4.0 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
We present the results of two separate regressions for the two different events – 1
st
 October and the 26th August 
events using Eviews 7.0.  
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Table 4.1:   1st October, 2010 Bombing Event 
Event Window -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
CAAR -2.10E+07 -4.10E+07 -6.30E+07 -8.50E+07 -1.10E+08 -1.30E+08 -1.50E+08 -1.70E+08 
t-CAAR -5929478053 -1.46E+10 -3.16E+10 -3.00E+10 -3.06E+10 -3.20E+10 -3.35E+10 -3.85E+10 
 
Table 4.1 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) arising in reaction of banks and 
insurance companies’ stocks to the terrorist attack that occurred on Nigeria’s 50
th
 Independence Anniversary 
Day. The result indicates that there were statistically significant negative abnormal  
returns at 5% levels all through the event window of 8 days. The fact that there were statistically 
significant abnormal returns some three days before the event day suggests that the event was partially pre-
empted by the market. This is not surprising because there had been threats of attack by MEND before the event 
of 1
st
 October. 
Table 4.2:  Abnormal Returns for UN Office Bombing 
Event Window -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
CAR 1.15E+03 2.29E+03 3.42E+03 4.56E+03 5.70E+03 5.70E+03 5.70E+03 5.70E+03 
t-CAR 1.35E+05 3.18E+05 3.58E+05 5.62E+05 -7.04E+04 2.71E+05 1.15E+05 -1.05E+04 
 
With respect to the second event – the UN embassy office bombing, there was a negative abnormal 
return a day after the event date and on the fourth post-event day, which were however statistically insignificant 
at 5% levels. The implication of this result is that the stock market though reacted negatively to the terrorist 
attack- hence the negative abnormal returns- the event was not as significant as the independence anniversary 
day bombing. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The study examined the impact of terrorism on emerging stock markets using the case of Nigeria. Pointedly, the 
paper investigated the reaction of prices of some stocks listed on the Nigerian Stock Market to two major 
terrorist events (the bomb blast on October 1, 2010 and the bombing of the United Nation’s (UN) embassy office 
on August 26, 2011, all in Abuja). Mainly secondary data obtained from the Nigeria stock Exchange were used. 
The study finds that while the 1
st
 October, 2010 bombing resulted in statistically significant negative abnormal 
returns, the UN office bombing though resulted in negative abnormal returns on the first and fourth post-event 
days, the abnormal returns were however not statistically significant at 5% level.     
The study further explores the efficacy of the inter-agency synergy in combating the hydra-headed evil 
of terrorism and finds that even with the urgency of the need for inter-agency co-operation coming to the fore by 
reason of recent developments, such sudden imperative only helped to expose years of worrisome rivalry 
between and among these agencies. It also brought to fore the abysmal lack of capacity to deal with this new 
threat. 
The study therefore recommends that the various security agencies in the country should be made to 
work in harmony so as to be able to deal with the problem of terrorism in view of the increasing sophistication 
and expertise with which such terror acts are unleashed in the country. 
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